



Industrial Internet Consortium

Reference Architecture Dynamic Composition and Automated Interoperability Challenge



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Challenge: IIC-RA Chapter 16

Chapter 16 Dynamic Composition and Automated Interoperability

Section 16.3 Functional Components

- Dynamic Composition
- Integration Contract Management



IIC-RA Viewpoint

Chapter 7 Implementation Viewpoint

- Relevant for all architectures described
- Edge and Device software dynamic composition
- CPU and OS agnostic
- Hardware configuration aware
 - ◆ part of integration contract




“Hidden” Challenge

Vendor Quality Assurance Department potential chokepoint

- Technical Challenge
 - ◆ Proof of dynamic composition and integration automation
- Process Challenge
 - ◆ Transition from “big bang” QA to continuous integration, verification and delivery (Agile concept)
- Mindset Challenge
 - ◆ History is against us
 - ◆ But, Michael Barr's Trial Testimony - Blackbox Testing Insufficient




Firmware Development Process





Continuous Deployment





Software Dynamic Composition

Critical Features

Verifiable Component Isolation Enables

- Component Dependency Resolution
- Component Verification - Automated Tools (e.g. SA)
- Component Automated Unit, System, Regression Test

Component Resource Requirements

- Core Integration Contract Data
- Output From Development and Verification



Objective: Isolation Independence

Show Stability of Software Dynamic Composition

- Transient Composition - Reacting to Events
- Persistent Composition - General Component Updates
- Online “Live” Composition - No Reset/Restart
- Offline Composition
 - ◆ May Require Operation Mode Change



Security Concerns!!!





Automotive Hacks!

- Fiat Chrysler Jeep Hack

<http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/>

- GM ONStar

http://analysis.tu-auto.com/telematics/weekly-brief-100-gadget-hacks-gm-cars-build-defcon-hacker-conference?utm_campaign=TUA%2003AUG15%20Newsletter.htm&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua&elq=4091a7b3978a4049217ebe887202e08&elqCampaignId=2953&elqaid=7083&elqat=1&elqTrackId=55347cd6af6941a988002bc6552eb6fc

<https://threatpost.com/holes-in-progressive-dongle-could-lead-to-car-hacks/110511>



Security Level for Embedded Systems

- VxWorks

<https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2010/08/02/shiny-old-vxworks-vulnerabilities>

- QNX


<https://www.fishnetsecurity.com/6labs/blog/pentesting-qnx-neutrino-rtos>

<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-13-189-01>

- Debugger port common practice
 - pdebug, qconn, netcat, qnet
 - similar for other OS's



Attack Vectors





Examples of Attacks

- Fieldbus (CAN, MOD, Etc.) emulator
 - rogue packet insertion
 - reprogramming
 - jamming
- Wired Ethernet
 - snooping of data
 - insertion of bogus data
- USB Port/SD Card
 - system reprogramming
- Peripheral Device Compromise
 - local control
 - rogue packets, etc.
- Wifi/Bluetooth/Zigbee
 - dictionary attack
 - opaque traffic analysis



Cyber Threats

- Denial of Service
- Hijacked Bot Attack
- Dictionary Attack
- Remote commanding of physical systems
- Falsified Sensor and Control Data – impacting local and distributed systems
- Breach of data privacy



Security Reference Material

- Senator Markey's Spycar Act
 - reference
- Industrial Internet Security Framework
 - Under development
- Trusted Computing Group Trusted Platform Module
 - TCG TPM
- ARM Trustzone
- Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)



Core Security Concepts

- Secure Hash Algorithm
 - (SHA 256)
- Symmetric Key Encryption/Decryption
 - (AES 256)
- Assymmetric Key Encryption/Decryption
 - RSA
 - ECC
- “Shielded Locations”
 - one-time programmable bits




Cyber Threat Prevention

- Dictionary Retry Delays
- Secure Outbound Connect-only Messaging
 - end-to-end client verification
- Secure Applet Sandbox
- Whitelisting
- Local bus intrusion detection




Security Concepts for JamaicaCAR & Jamaica-IoT

Combined Jamaica-IoT, Messaging & Cloud Security Domain with hardened Device operating system and hardware






JamaicaVM-IoT Security Stack





JamaicaVM-IoT Security Direction



Security Direction

- Continuous Whitelist Verifier
 - .JAR,.EXE,.SO Signature Verifier
 - Running process monitoring
- Encrypted App Manager
 - Symmetric Decryption with protected key
 - Obfuscation guard technology
- Fieldbus Intrusion Detection
 - Learned Patterns Based
 - Transparent
- Fieldbus Counter measures
 - Intentional Jamming
 - Mode protection
 - Command counter ing
 - Warnings/ Emergency Shut down
 - Global notification
- Continuous Port Scanning
 - Close unauthorized ports
 - Identify rogue software



Software Supplychain Security



Supplychain Components

- Verification Stage Requirements
 - Toolchain
 - Code Verification
 - Supplier
 - Deployment
 - Installation
 - Runtime
 - API Permissioning



Supplychain Signatures

- Tool chain signature – Aicas Certificate
- Code verification – Supplier Certificate
- Supplier – OEM Certificate
- Deployment – OEM Certificate
- Installation – OEM/Supplier/Toolchain verification
- Runtime – Local Signature Verification
- API Permissions – OEM/Supplier signatures



Device-as-a-Service (DaaS) Concept



DaaS

Ubiquitous Software Platform

- Available on Gateways, Sensors, Actuators, Monitors, Controllers, etc.

Modular Architecture

- Applications, Components, Subcomponents

Hardware, OS Independence

- Leverages available hardware and OS
- Future Proof, heterogeneous environments

“Component Store”

DaaS Software Requirements

Secure OTA Dynamic Lifecycle

- Download, Install, Load, Run, Pause, Stop, Deinstall

Continuous Deployment

DaaS Admission Control Policy

- Managed Resource Limits

Standard APIs, Formally Defined Language and Programming Model

- Worldwide software community acceptance


Support Control Systems, PLCs, etc.

- Periodic Tasks, Event-driven Tasks
- Realtime/Determinism
- Device I/O
- Industry-specific Protocols

General Resource Efficiency


- Scalable with resource availability

IIoT DaaS





JamaicaVM-IoT Security Stack





JamaicaVM Runtime & Realtime Specification for Java

RTSJ 2.0 (draft) : e.g. User Space Device Drivers


Ahead-of-Time Compiled JAR
Loader and Executor

OpenJDK/J2SE
Java Runtime Environment

Multicore, Parallel, Concurrent, Non-blocking,
Preemptible, Deterministic Garbage Collector



Jamaica Process Level Virtualization





Jamaica Reliable OSGi

Per-OSGi bundle,
memory consumption
limits

Per-OSGi bundle,
CPU consumption limits

System Resources
Constraint-based
OSGi Bundle Loading

Per-OSGi bundle,
Force-kill

Persistent, Non-terminating, Realtime OSGi Framework



OSGi Bundle Management Services

Exception Handling

Secure Remote
Messaging Interface

OSGi Bundle Installation
Signature Verification

System Monitoring &
Logging

Per-OSGi Bundle
Resource Assignment

OSGi Bundle Loading
Signature Verification



Jamaica-IoT Service Bus

Active-Active Standby &
Hot Standby

Streaming, Inline Message Filtering
& Action Triggers

Federated &
Scalable



US Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) Certified

Fully Compliant XMPP Implementation

End-to-end Security



Typical IIoT DaaS Node Example





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